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Kirsten Grind Education. (2012) 'The Lost Bank The Story of Washington Mutual--The Biggest Bank Failure in American History.'

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Wamu 14, Washington 13, Kerry Killinger 12, Us 10, California 6, Seattle 6, New York 4, D.c. 4, Sheila Bair 3, Dillinger 3, America 3, Charlotte 2, Hank Paulson 2, Fdic 2, U.s. 2, Iowa 2, Jaime Dimond 2, Rahm 1, Pendleton 1, Deutsch 1,
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  CSPAN    Book TV    Kirsten Grind  Education.  (2012) 'The Lost Bank The Story  
   of Washington Mutual--The Biggest Bank Failure in American...  

    October 6, 2012
    10:00 - 11:00am EDT  

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friend again. sorry there is no big bank failure to cover today. >> but lovely weather. >> i am from phoenix. those days make me depressed but i will get by. .. and we would all start out with any of the things one would think.
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>> he was one of the early ceos at wamu during the 1980's and i thought it was important to start out because he represents a time in the banking system that has been lost. he represents a time when and banks were much smaller and a very customer focused in the communities suddenly, and wamu during that time was known as the son of the family as i'm sure a lot of you know, and lee pepper infused the bank with an amazing culture where we known across the region as a great place to do banking. it was terrific for employees who worked there and a terrific for customers and then all of that began to change. islamic everybody has these blind spots, and in this case something as when he would come to him he would buy a small
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dealer and maybe want to tell us about that a little bit. >> so come and he walked into his office this young guy about 31-years-old and his name was carried hellinger and he was sharp as attack. he knew everything about financial reporting and he had won these -- rahm these mutual funds and everyone of the bank was just sort of in all about his knowledge and he really became a protege. so when it was time for wu to pass the bank on to someone else it made sense that he passed on to carry it dillinger. at that time we should say wamu was still a very small regional bank. wu had done a wonderful job of growing it but is still only have about $9 billion in assets and nobody else outside of seattle had heard of it. >> at the same time, when most
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people think of the terrie kepplinger they came to know that's not the first thing we get to know. i was fascinated by the background that you painted. the last guy in the world that you would expect to be a stiff banker or risky banker. sestak absolutely not. he was a humble guy from iowa. he had a classic charm people picked up baseball games on his lawn and he married his high school sweetheart. he put himself through state school, she was a very humble, every ethical country by the book. he was also extremely awkward i should say. he was much more comfortable
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looking at financial reports. but there was nothing crazy about him. >> except he was a trumpeter. >> except he was a trumpeter and he would play the trumpet at work in and pull your activities but it was perhaps a little bit strange but not for wamu because they had a very fun culture, so he was one of the first in his family that was sent in actual musician. he was a musician but not for his job. >> he went on an acquisition spree for at least a thrift was pretty awesome. why don't you tell us about that? >> absolutely. kerry took over this thing in 1990 and he had a team a fabulous people surrounded him that lee pepper had also chosen and together they worked like clockwork and they were able to
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cross the country just buying banks left and right it was during the acquisition spree in the 1990's so there was a crisis going on. they grew rapidly through the nineties and by the end of the decade they had become the country's largest savings loan bank across the country. and kerry killinger had become america's favorite a banker. everyone loves wamu. they could do no wrong and they created this concept we know now although it is not going away which is free checking accounts. you could go to wamu and not have to pay any of those of allain fees' that we pay to other banks and the essentially forced the other banks to follow suit, so they were the most popular company anywhere. >> they were very good as some of the hard things in the
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financial acquisition merging computer systems. they do it over a weekend. tell us a little bit about that so the customer wouldn't feel anything when they were going in. >> absolutely. we don't think of these things we just think of our bank as a bank but when they buy another bank is a very complicated terrifying proposition because you have to banks you have to combine the systems and they do it for a class of the customers don't notice. well, wamu is expert at that and that is the key to any bank that is trying to make these larger acquisitions so they were able to do this in a way that the customer wouldn't notice. it was a bank that was deficient at anything they did and when they came in, these other banks were very frugal, they took away the corporate credit cards the, the jet planes.
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these other bankers would have outlandish accounts in their offices decorated like the wild west with high-rise office buildings. they flew coach everywhere. they were very frugal. >> at least at that point. >> we are still in the 90's. >> but there was this kind of, again, almost like a thriller there was a for shuttling, and was a small called long beach mortgage. as the mcgill is a lender near disneyland in california. >> they would give a sense of asset size so people can understand how this shouldn't have meant anything yet it ended up being consequential. >> was a tiny fraction of the
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assets of the acquisition of as an afterthought so this company made subprimal loans, it made mortgages to people whose credit was not that great and wamu's thinking of the time was we have these requirements under the community reinvestment act and that is saying that you are basically required to make loans to these people in this capacity and some prime lending could become popular in the 90's because the prime loans were not making that much money anymore. so one of wamu's chiefs went out looking around for a good sub prime linder and landed on long beach mortgage and it was the least dodging of all of the subprimal lenders he could find because there's shady stuff going on in the companies and so
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began the the playing this lender in the 90's and they broke away from what they had been doing originally. >> what was it about long beach that would begin the cancer that overwhelmed the system? speed tickets agrees that you call with a cancer because it really was like. there were several things about it, a big thing that not a lot of people pay attention to is that there was in california which would become the epicenter of the sub prime so it was far away from the borders where everything was being controlled. also long beach wasn't the kind of linder where you walk into the bank and talk to someone and
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get a loan. that is what they had done most the before and. long beach didn't actually talk to people alone through mortgage brokers which didn't work for wamu so there were all these people out there accumulating all these loans because there is no quality control involved in that. >> the banking industry had red line minority and poor areas and there's this kind of conspiracy theory out there that the reason we have a banking meltdown in 2008 is because all of these minority deadbeat wanted mortgages and that is not the case and that is not with the community reinvestment act was
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about but it did require certain compliance. but the big thing that you eliminate in the book is that this was not just altruism. subprimal lending was profitable. >> investor's for spending far more money than conventional mortgage said in the business everything is driven so they could make for greater returns on these risky mortgages than on a regular 30 year mortgage so because of that there suddenly became a huge incentive to make more subprime mortgages than other risky loans. >> wall street byes it comes slices it, dices it, selzer. it's hugely profitable and it seemed risk free because having prices will never go down,
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mortgage prices will need a reliable khanna than the institutions get pressure back we want more, we want more. but there is a point in the book long before the house in double where under kerry killinger wamu gets in trouble with nearly 2,000. what happened? >> the interesting thing but wamu is people like to paint a picture about the problems have been, you know, the happened in the three years before the 2008 failure. the problem started long before that and we can .2000. that's when they started to go downhill and one of the reasons they said is a was at that point that kerry killinger said we want to become the country's biggest mortgage lender and he internally began to push into the mortgage lending.
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the slogan turned from friend of the family to the power of yes and suddenly their slogan was blasted across kaine square in new york on billboards across the country and that is what they were dedicated to so that pushed up the ball rolling. >> before we get into the good stuff, and it's all good stuff, i covered charlotte as they were going on the biggest banking acquisitions in history and they were real commercial banks and washington mutual as a thrift savings and loan, and this would matter a lot leader because to
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my mind -- and i just want your reflection on the scum washington mutual was a kind of drastic park survivor of the savings-and-loan industry but of which had collapsed. the commercial banking industry liked the competition they wanted it to go away so they went on the savings and loan collapse and the remaining s&l were folded under the fdic. there used to be a federal savings and loan insurance but they didn't pass certain advantages the banks had. they were not controlled regularly by the comptroller of the currency or the fed so it is america's largest banking
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failure but it almost seems like this gargantuan institutions was playing the role of the bank but they didn't have the advantages of bank of america or wachovia. >> absolutely. they were not actually a bank if you will. it's important to point held under their charter of the threat, wamu had to make a percentage of mortgages. it wasn't that just one day they decided to make mortgages. they were always making mortgages because they had to they just went down a different road than they had been previously. >> he needed to things with a passion, mortgage lending and investment bankers.
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take that for what it's worth. things started to change. he changed a very tight-knit management group started to grow apart. maybe you want to walk us through that. >> two things started to happen at once. this is a really crucial time frame for wamu. kerry killinger began to really believe that wamu should be in east coast institution and became obsessed with the notion of having the bank compete with these chongging and banks on the east coast and at the same time he began to change personally. he left his wife of 30 years and she had been credited with keeping him grounded. he remarried when the who was less so and they can obsessed
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with the trappings of a ceo after the span of his career they were suddenly flying corporate jets around the country. they built -- you may recall down the street we have a giant skyscraper the was built and around that time. when loc.gov/bookfest became obsessed with these things he thought a big bank should have said he was changing personally and at the same time the bank will sell large he was bringing in these new executives from the east coast and was becoming a very different culture so a lot of the people began to leave. they were frustrated and they didn't get along with the east coast people and the culture began to deteriorate. islamic is there also concern on the part of the old-timers about
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the safety and soundness of the banking that they were doing. >> absolutely. there was a lot of the problems were bubbling to the surface at this .2 or three years after the bought long beach mortgage they're starting to be whisperings of fraud going on in the mortgage unit in california. these sort of things were bubbling to the surface. people were trying to bring them up and they kept getting shut down. finally in 2003 they launched an internal investigation and found that basically a huge chunk of the mortgages that they were making and selling to investors around the world were just garbage. you heard a couple years ago about how the banks couldn't --
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this is still going on by the way but it can to the limelight a couple years ago. they couldn't foreclose on people because they didn't have the paperwork. wamu had no papeork back in 2003. people's mortgage files were literally like a scribbled a piece of paper in a file said they had to the massive overhaul and that is before any of us would hear anything about sub prime loans. >> why did she change? >> that's a good question. i spend a lot of time asking people that very question. i think that it's very hard for anyone to stand up and have the whole country tell you over and over again how great you are and how you are the best banker in the world and how your country has achieved a massive seat in
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only ten years and you have the expectations every year at some point you begin to believe his own press and he became a different person to the he started wearing very fancy clothes to work and he didn't wear his all court looking glasses any more. but he was a different person. >> to be fair he declined to talk to you for the book. >> he wrote a letter of that. >> you ought to put that as a blurb that he made clear his dissatisfaction.
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the crash happens, the recession of 2000, 2001. the scandals and the other and there is always capital the world looking for someplace to go, and alan greenspan. a true story. floods the market with cheap credit and all that money that has been on wall street goes to real-estate and lending and mortgages, and it's not just the american dream anymore in the pursuit of happiness. if you don't sell that house of a couple of years you are not being patriotic and you need to flip houses. it seems so long ago after what we've been through, and yet it was just yesterday when this
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radical change comes about this change is the capitol markets, completely up the stakes for wamu and reveals tremendous fault lines and maybe you want to watch us on from there. >> all this money is flooding the system, and it essentially becomes the wild west in california specifically in mortgage lending so one of the most i opening plants to me is when i spent a good month in california interviewing these loan officers and mortgage brokers who are part of this craziness at the time and it is not an exaggeration when i say that literally dead people were getting a mortgage as. there's a third one in the book about the chief legal officer
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told me about where they were investigating one of the loans cong for the bank and his name was jose flores and he was supposed to be a gardiner while they ran the social security check. the only ran a because the mortgages were under review. they would have never done such an expensive check at this time. and they found out what he actually does so they go to jose that is like a 23-year-old guy the social security number he says hang on with a sheet of paper. and they kept the sheet of paper because she couldn't believe it. this is the sort of thing that was happening all the time.
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wamu is a mirror to what happened in the system, so at that point, wamu is leading the charge, but every one, almost every financial institution was going for it as well and wamu was competing with countrywide to make the most optioned mortgages and subprime mortgages and all these other risky mortgages. >> was there an understanding in the office and the complexity in which these mortgages were being ratcheted up the food chain? >> wamu as in wamu headquarters had some understanding. at least i would like to believe had some understanding. at the ground level, absolutely not. so these loan officers frequently knew that they were making mortgages to people that
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had no chance of paying them back at all but in the back of their head they had been told by the house quarters wall street is buying them and is going to do something with them so they need just normal people off the street rather than throwing out degrees but they're making a ton of money on the commission and they are being told wall street is when to take these mortgages and the rest is going to disappear so they just really believed that. these guys on wall street let's just keep making these mortgages and we are making a ton of money. why wouldn't we? >> some of the banks recovered the regulators were highly compromised in the sense that the fed who were regulators were
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trained at charlotte and the first union and the banks spent literally hundreds of millions of dollars to get glass-steagall repealed. was it like for washington mutual and the regulators? >> washington mutual no longer existed naturally the office of the first supervision. now the interesting thing is that was formed after the savings and loan crisis so of the banking regulators, it had this inferiority complex. it was smaller. it didn't have as much power and wanted to be regulating more banks so that need for power covered how was regulating the banks because it didn't care so much what the banks were doing but just that it had a lot of
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assets under its control. so d.o.t. yes was regulating wamu and countrywide and a lot of these other mortgage lenders so you saw that there was very locked regulation. there's just not a lot of attention being paid to what is going on. >> when the crisis becomes unstoppable, there were efforts made to save the institution. handicap those efforts for us. what were the chances? >> of wamu surviving? >> i want to get into that a little bit later but when private equity, texas partners a
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very good record they decide to put money into this it seems like there's a little breathing room. it dillinger is forced out for what, six weeks. >> the crisis they say it happens slowly and quickly and that was absolutely the case that began to get a really bad. all of their issues internally had fallen apart. they were making mortgages on 12 different systems and they had grown so fast there was no control internally. the mortgage division ballooned out of control and they had a massive trading desk. they turned into not a mortgage lender with only 15 years earlier in mortgage middleman in which they were sucking up mortgages and spitting them out and making a lot of money in the
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train. they turned into this just as the housing prices have been going of astronomically every year and began to crash so suddenly wamu is left withholding all of these risky mortgages and all of the homeowners that could have refinanced couldn't anymore because they were not there to support it so suddenly wamu that had been profitable for how many years at that point he had always delivered amazing returns they were eating away the top of the cushion and needed more money so in the spring of 2008, they decide you're going to either try to sell the bank or raise private equity and no one wanted to sell the bank and jpmorgan chase wanted to buy it and jaime dimond was asking kerry if he wanted to buy yet and he never wanted to so they
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raised about 7 billion in private equity from this group of financiers and they made it through. they raised a lot of money in the turnaround point. >> what i find interesting is one doesn't have to be a conspiracy not to start to see these things that the timing was just off by that much on so many fronts because they're came a point when overruling sheila bair of the fcc they said we're going to back everybody with everything and you're never
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going to have another wamu. but washington mutual did not have political washington, d.c., washington mutual was not in new york bank there was a healthy part of washington mutual in the retail branches, so the regulators that have their real power don't care. sheila bair wants to shut it down and meanwhile something interesting is happening in the bank job. >> you point out kerry killinger never made a priority of building up these relationships in washington, d.c.. he just never did come wamu didn't have a look of any funds
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back there. meanwhile there were bankers like jaime dimond who consider their line of business so wamu suddenly finds itself even after it raised all this money in the summer of 2008 in the middle of a panic situation they just field in california and remember we saw the picture of the line around the block and people pulling up their money and it's a wonderful life and how could this happen. everyone panicked. what no one knew is that wamu suffered a run that was far bigger and they did it very quietly. no one knew about the time that they were leaving massive amounts of money every day so kerry killinger panicked about this run and called hank paulson and the treasury secretary because he's heard that there's going to be a negative media reports coming out of both wamu
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and it's printed cause people to pull more money of and he gets hank paulson on the phone and he tells him he essentially there is no help coming because he should have sold to jpmorgan chase and that is when it becomes that a body that they have no friends in washington and then you say didier circumstances as you enter september of 2008. >> because jpmorgan didn't get the bank in the spring of 2008 jpmorgan is not a bank that likes to lose. they were not happy to have not won wamu in the spring so they were biding their time essentially until they could return and have another opportunity so you can bet they were taking the opportunity to meet with regulators, talk to regulators and often about wamu.
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>> we were both on a story for different publications covering it at the same time. this book is made up of so much more than that. tell us a little bit about the difficulty of getting to the bottom of some of these reports, what was really going on with the fdic and sheila bair. they didn't just respond to the freedom of information request via the >> no, they didn't. well, a lot of the work that we did in public records reflected i -- i am sure we will never forget when we received those e-mails back, we were trying to piece together exactly what had happened in the three weeks before the field because it was
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extremely secret. no one was talking about it, none of the government agencies would talk to us so we requested these e-mails which had shut them down and they all came down completely blocked off. all you could see the subject line was wamu. in fact the only art in this book is one of those blackout e-mails. we still had hundreds of them and so even after the process it is just a blow by blow of what was happening in seattle and in washington, d.c. and new york and it was like pulling teeth. i had to rely mostly on public record to peace what was going on because even three years later no one wanted to talk about it. it's very controversial.
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>> a lot of lives and broken hearts. >> one of the tragedies of the story that i hadn't known before is as kerry killinger was making these decisions to build on the mortgage lending and go down that path, lewd started writing these letters to kerry and others said the bank stating you shouldn't go down this road. this is a way to go. you need to get rid of all these loans. the culture change the bank now they were focused on being driven instead of the values of being a fair and caring and human and lou was upset about this but as you can imagine in 2005 he had been away from the bank for so long and when he shows up everyone is busy.
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it was a tragedy all around. >> what surprised you the most in your reporting and writing of this book? >> one of the things that continues to surprise me every day is the headline we are seeing of how much the regulators were able to get away with. it's astounding in this country that we have these gigantic financial institutions and even a smaller ones like we saw the huge collapse in on iowa and such little regulation leading happen to the crisis the regulators were so focused on who was in charge of regulating wamu should you do the exam rather than actually doing the exam and paying attention to what was going on.
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as bennett essentially their paychecks depend on the regulated lightly even though our president is a socialist muslim islamofacist goldwater republican it continues to this day. islamic before this you're talking about the latest scandal. you can pretty much up in the paper and read about the latest period's we're going to take questions now. a wonderful elimination on the book and i know some people have written questions so we don't have a mom to seem and they will
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bring them down. i've been told to ask to more questions. what's happened to lou? is he still are now? >> yeah. he had the house and palm desert during his midlife crisis he bought a couple houses and palm desert. >> did he get a loan? [laughter] >> i never investigated but he's not really welcome at the reunions. >> i don't see his name on the invite list. >> he moved back to new york so he was the president of wamu and
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arrived in 2005 for three years so pretty much the second of the banks failed he moved back and i hear that he is working in the financial services but it's not anywhere of that we would have heard of. >> and the shareholders wiped out, and you have a very affecting kind of a bookend and i don't want to give away too much, but you actually now work with people who were not the high rollers you just believe in the seattle thrift. estimate the was the sort of misconception about shareholders and across the country they would invest in wamu and 80s.
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>> a thick stack of i will take off my glasses so i can figure that out of home and its grand be on national television. [laughter] why -- i've asked this before, why shouldn't kerry killinger be in prison? [applause] >> we've talked a lot about the regulators but we haven't talked a lot about the regulation, of the multiple investigations into wamu in putting an extensive criminal investigation as there have been in the other financial institutions and the answer is that there is no law that they
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could hang them on. they could find nothing illegal and it wasn't for the want of trying and that's why we've still not seen the high level executives go to jail and why they are trying to push forward all of this nonsense financial reform the haven't been able to do. >> i don't know if it was for want of trying. >> you have the attorney general and the banks to own the place as upset about the senate. there wasn't an urge to prosecute. there were three questions i just want to be fair to affairs if you could change any part of the book, what would it be? >> that's a good question. i wonder if they mean if i would have written something or if the book history could have been
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different. >> if i would have written something differently that is an interesting question. i would like to have actually talked to kerry killinger, so that would have changed. i could have spent the entire book talking about the last month because there were so many politics and the decision appeared. >> has anyone been fascinated particularly execs? >> no, they had not. >> there was an attempt that led to a settlement may be what you
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briefly tell us about that. >> the fdic that was the regulator made this attempt to sue kerry killinger in the mortgage division and they ended up they sued for a billion dollars which was unheard of and they end up settling out of court for a fraction of that 64 million or something ridiculously low, and by the way most of that settlement is covered by the executive insurance policies that the banks. so they paid almost nothing either. here's another so i'm going to pick and forgive me i will try to come back to you for those that have shares of the savings which are merged with wamu, is there any chance of their shares with anything? >> probably not, no. >> how would one find out? my suspicion is don't waste the brain damage.
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>> you would have to work through the bankruptcy court of the holding company which is the one not filed for bankruptcy, and i believe they have reached a settlement finally earlier this year so the shareholders did get a little bit back but not a lot. >> do you think jpmorgan chase got an extraordinary deal? the chip that he planted in my head will start to guide me around in just a minute. let me finish the question, an extraordinary deal on the asset or was the low price justified by the associated problems? >> jpmorgan paid 1.9 million for the bank of $307 million in assets. so they absolutely got a screaming deal. now, they felt that was
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justified because all these terrible mortgages. but let's be clear these terrible mortgages haven't kept jpmorgan from being profitable. they barely dented the bank. meanwhile, the reason they wanted wamu many ways for its branch network across the country and especially on the west coast. wamu had thousands of branches and jpmorgan was on the west coast and they had branches now they are doing great, so they got an amazing deal. >> too big to fail got bigger and we lost a major corporate headquarters, so the auditors in the board, why didn't they blow the whistle and come forward? >> they've been the most under examined in any group in the
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financial crisis and none of them to my knowledge i could be wrong about this, the board many of them had been on the board for years and they were lulled by the amazing performance that was delivered in the decades before, so they were not really asking any tough questions until it was too late and then they waited an extraordinarily long time to get rid of kerry killinger and put in new management when they should have done it a year or two before that. >> they were among the highest paid for in the country second in the fact or something. so you can see what money pays for. did the wall street collapse very? in my reading that right?
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banks in the u.s. and washington? did i get that right? does that make sense to you? >> how did the -- we lost our biggest financial institution. jpmorgan took over. we only have a major bank headquartered here anymore. so, what were the consequences of that beyond the ecosystem that was thousands of employees and vendors and so forth? >> of course in the seattle area it was just a massive loss and massive affect, but as you pointed out, though too big to fail institutions got bigger, so now instead of this bank that had been integrated into seattle in this area is gone, and we
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have five banks that are controlling most of the assets in this country. >> and they are not here. they don't contribute to the community the same way. [laughter] the fcc if i read this right captured regulators in a mess so what is to be done? >> if we head the solution i don't know what i would be doing that may be in the next book i don't really know what the solution is. they are having trouble passing dodd-frank which is the financial reform, and it seems like even with more regulators in place we are not making any inroads and regulating the financial institutions and that is an incredible proposition in of the way out is a mess.
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>> you bring back glass-steagall [applause] you put in place incentives so the banks don't gamble because then there is a transition tax so they invest in making loans for the economic activity. you put in place incentives so they are not compensating the excess of risk and you have to repeal citizens united and get politics out of the system. [applause] she actually reports. [laughter] you mentioned that wamu has no friends in washington, d.c.. how do we have our own representatives such as cantwell? >> this is a good question and i've competed some journalists
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reporting on the stories we reached out on multiple occasions because after wamu collapsed she made a big show coming out saying we are going to leave this investigation into this collapse. we'll go to the guilt what happened, and so she is extremely quiet on everything and didn't do anything for the bookkeeper and is just basically to my knowledge kind of ignored it. as the mick would you think of the aftershocks scenario to the u.s. economy and how will the affect the too big to fail banks and if i read this right, the rest of us. >> the after shock. >> i can speculate on what it
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is, the lingering depression, the slowdown in asia, and the fact that the financial system is still engaged in the incredibly risky behavior. are we talking about statements here? we will go with my theory. >> everyone is being affected by these right now and you see jpmorgan chase as a loss that was bad on your up, right? but in a way the institutions are so big that they are shielded because even with that massive trading law you see jpmorgan returning profits, so they are very respective but we have created the system where the biggar just gigantic. estimate and they know that they will be built up by the taxpayer and that creates what they call
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moral hazard. describe -- this is a great question because we get a bill but to much inside baseball journalism in the world all three of us. describe the problems inherent in the optional arm product and its aggressive push by wamu. >> that is a great question because we didn't get into that. wamu basically everyone knows for their sub prime lending that one of the risky products and actually biggest is the option armload so this is an incredibly dodging mortgage where you could actually choose between the various options each month, you pay your loan. one of the options is to pay the minimum balance and the amount you weren't paying gets tacked on to your principal cingular
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krin that you just don't know it because you are fooling yourself thinking you are paying the minimum amount which by the way everyone did for the most part because when you get your mortgage bill why didn't you pay the minimum amount? so what happened is all of these homeowners were adding to their debt, but wamu liked that there subprimal cuts all these option arms for a ridiculous amount of money to wall street. they were eating them up like crazy. so part of the push was to make a lot more option on the mortgages, so they were thinking of them like crazy. >> amazing underwater city. hauer lee was the publicity about wamu and i assume the political reports. >> so, wamu had a big blowup in
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2004 that wasn't really hurt about but what happened is we spoke a little bit about how they basically had no infrastructure at the bank. they were operating on 12 different mortgage systems. all of that emerged around 2004 when they began basically trying to foreclose on homeowners who had actually pay their mortgage and the reason they did that is because they literally forgot to tell someone to go open the security boxes and pick up the homeowners checks. this is how bad it got. so the state started suing and all the analysts started writing reports saying they can't run a mortgage operation. this is what forced kerry killinger to get a president and chief operating officer. and that got bad publicity before. i think it was pretty bad and
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early 2007. that is different than the press. thank you you for your buck. i am a loan officer of 21 years' experience in seattle, and i can say you got it right, and this person's question is other than paul krugman i don't recall any journalist singing this is a bubble in 2004, 2005 to the when animals called? yes i did. [laughter] did you -- >> no, absolutely not. i think there were people in the financial press who were raising questions, but there was also the economic orthodoxy most
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economists were very reassuring, and again i had the platform of the column so i could call it, but he was an economist and not a journalist. did jpmorgan gain anything due to the failure? are you out there? [laughter] anyway, did jpmorgan dena anything with the dillinger? >> yes, the did nothing to gain anything. they gained more than the 2,000 branches across the country. all of those employees began the preference that was had, and they got no amount of money in this pesky more deutsch problem that they had to deal with. ceramica mid-1990s, they owned or had control of the large piece of the planet's southern california. one of the last pieces of the
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original and the city in camp pendleton. >> that is interesting someone asked about that. i don't know the answer and i wish i did and i can tell you when i was researching especially in the 90's i would have to spend an insane amount of time reading press clippings and a lot of stuff about that kept coming and i kept thinking i wish i had more time to think about this because it felt really interesting but i never really actually did. so one fortunately there don't know the answer. >> i'm sorry to say that i've been given the signal to wind things up. this was done in a fair fashion and will be around leader of the last question is after the collapse of wamu, losing money stops only to a few cents. where does the 20 million come from to pay the bonus? >> that is a great question. there was just enough money
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left. [laughter] >> how do i get a job like that? >> the book is the lost bank. thank you so much for being with us tonight. [applause] this is the first parish church in brownswick main and it is significant to the story of uncle tom's cabin the story began here

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